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INTRODUCTION
Business law does not exist in a vacuum. Escalating concerns over
climate change, rising socioeconomic inequality, and other complex
challenges have accelerated the search for sustainable relationships to bind
our global community.1 Our growing awareness of the risks at hand has
resulted in mounting expectations for corporations to transform, innovate,

*

Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Victoria. Thank you to Kyle Fogden, Chuck
O’Kelley, Lori Lamb, the participants of The Benefit Corporation and the Firm Commitment Universe
symposium at the Adolf A. Berle, Jr. Center on Corporations, Law and Society at Seattle University
School of Law, and Stephanie Gambino and the editors of the Seattle University Law Review, for
helpful comments. Thank you also to Sergio Ortega (University of Victoria, J.D. 2018) for exceptional
research assistance.
1. See WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM, GLOBAL RISKS (10th ed., 2015), http://reports.weforum.org/
global-risks-2015/executive-summary/ [https://perma.cc/7AUL-YBHS].
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and play a role in lessening those risks.2 The term “corporate social
responsibility” (CSR) may no longer be an appropriate descriptor for
trends within the movement.3 Rather, “social innovation” is becoming the
new catchphrase of the day, emerging as the auspicious cousin to CSR as
corporations move toward integrating business concepts with social
activism in order to solve pressing social and environmental problems.4
The growth of the “social enterprise,” often referring to either a for-profit
trying to “do good,” an enterprising nonprofit, or a corporate group
formation of the two, suggests a shift in the business landscape.5
Legislators are beginning to craft new corporate legal entities to meet
growing demands from social entrepreneurs seeking governing
infrastructure to house their social businesses.
Corporate hybridity is a new innovation in business law that had its
start in industry and is garnering attention within academic scholarship. In
the corporate context, a “hybrid”6 can be defined as a corporate legal
structure that blends traditional for-profit and nonprofit legal
characteristics that enable—and at times, require—businesses to pursue
both economic and social mandates. Canada has begun to act upon this
new legal phenomenon, with two provinces adopting hybrid corporations
similar to the community interest company in the United Kingdom (U.K.),

2. See, e.g., David A. Lubin & Daniel C. Esty, The Sustainability Imperative, HARV. BUS. REV.,
May 2010.
3. The prospect of defining CSR is not an easy one, and this Article refrains from delving into
that debate. Dirk Matten and Jeremy Moon explain the difficulty in that “[f]irst, . . . CSR is an
‘essentially contested concept,’ being ‘appraisive’ (or considered as valued), ‘internally complex,’ and
having relatively open rules of application. Second, CSR is an umbrella term overlapping with some,
and being synonymous with other, conceptions of business-society relations. Third, it has clearly been
a dynamic phenomenon.” Dirk Matten & Jeremy Moon, “Implicit” and “Explicit” CSR: A Conceptual
Framework for a Comparative Understanding of Corporate Social Responsibility, 33:2 ACAD. MGMT.
REV. 404, 405 (2008) (internal citations omitted). Ultimately, “[t]heories of corporate social
responsibility cast a potentially broader net, emphasizing all of the social costs of corporate activity,
and therefore embrace, for example, environmental or political concerns as well as stakeholder
interests.” David Millon, New Game Plan or Business as Usual? A Critique of the Team Production
Model of Corporate Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1001, 1002 n.5 (2000).
4. See, e.g., Tim Draimin, Corporate Social Responsibility is Dead, Long Live Corporate Social
Innovation, SOC. INNOVATION GENERATION (July 12, 2010), http://www.sigeneration.ca/corporatesocial-responsibility-is-dead-long-live-corporate-social-innovation%E2%80%A8/ [https://perma.cc/
M9BS-NF5X]; Chris Atchison, Corporate Social Responsibility: A Clear Business Case, GLOBE &
MAIL (Mar. 16, 2010), http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/education/corporate-socialresponsibility-a-clear-business-case/article599864/ [https://perma.cc/3ZU9-4J5Q].
5. See, e.g., Victor Pestoff & Lars Hulgård, Participatory Governance in Social Enterprise, 27
VOLUNTAS 1742 (2016).
6. Also known as a “blended enterprise.” See, e.g., Dana Brakman Reiser, Governing and
Financing Blended Enterprise, 85 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 619 (2010).
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providing traditional nonprofit organizations with a means to raise equity
capital and issue a capped amount of dividends.7
In past years, Canadian legislators have felt pressure to implement
the American benefit corporation model into existing provincial and
federal corporate laws.8 The benefit corporation aims to address the needs
of social purpose businesses operating in the for-profit sector by requiring
a “public benefit” purpose, among other governing features. B Lab, the
nonprofit organization behind the American B Corporation certification,
has actively lobbied its own state governments to adopt the benefit
corporation form. At one point it seemed B Lab had saturated the Canadian
social sector, partnering with several of Canada’s leading social innovators
to advocate for the benefit corporation model.9 Ontario and British
Columbia (B.C.) were particular hotspot provinces where benefit
corporation legislation was being contemplated. MaRS Discovery District,
a Canadian hub in social innovation, initiated a White Paper urging
legislators to create an equivalent to the benefit corporation, calling it “an
opportunity for Canada.”10 In 2012, the B.C. Council for Social Innovation
issued an action plan to maximize social innovation in B.C., which

7. The British Columbia “community contribution company” (known as the C3) was made
available to businesses in July 2013. See Business Corporations Act, S.B.C. 2002, c. 57 (Can.). A
similar hybrid was made publicly available in Nova Scotia in 2016. See Community Interest
Companies Act, S.N.S. 2012, c 38 (Can.). The B.C. and Nova Scotia hybrids are modeled after the
U.K. community interest company, with governing features that include an asset lock and dividend
cap. The U.K. CIC has had considerable success since its implementation in 2005, with more than
12,500 registered CICs to date (overtaking the number of cooperatives in the country). See Office of
the Regulator of Community Interest Companies (@CICRegulator), TWITTER (Nov. 18, 2016, 2:17
AM), https://twitter.com/CICRegulator/status/799557182815670272 (tweeting the number of CICs on
public record as of November 18, 2016, at 12,579); see also OFFICE OF THE REGULATOR OF
COMMUNITY INTEREST COMPANIES, CIC REGULATOR: ANNUAL REPORT 2015 TO 2016 (2016). In
B.C., the C3 has not been nearly as successful. For more on the C3 model, see Carol Liao, Limits to
Corporate Reform and Alternative Legal Structures, in COMPANY LAW AND SUSTAINABILITY: LEGAL
BARRIERS AND OPPORTUNITIES 297 (Beate Sjåfjell & Benjamin Richardson eds., 2015).
8. See, e.g., Simon Avery, Canada Playing Catch-up in Social Enterprise, GLOBE & MAIL
(Oct. 19, 2010), http://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/small-business/sb-growth/canada-playing-catch-up-in-social-enterprise/article1316055/ [https://perma.cc/VAB9-H79X].
9. Adam Spence, In Search of the Benefit Corporation, MARS CTR. FOR IMPACT INVESTING
(Nov. 25, 2010), https://www.marsdd.com/news-and-insights/in-search-of-the-benefit-corporation/
[https://perma.cc/DK3C-BYGD]; Rachel Mendleson, Canadian ‘B Corps’ Put Their Money Where
Their Branding Is On Social Causes, HUFFINGTON POST CAN. (Feb. 3, 2012, 6:25 AM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.ca/2012/02/02/canada-b-corps-benefitcorporations_n_1251383.html
[https://perma.cc/FSR7-R32E];
10. STACEY CORRIVEAU ET AL., BENEFIT CORPORATIONS IN CANADA: A TOOL TO SUPPORT
BLENDED ENTERPRISE IN CANADA, MARS CENTRE FOR IMPACT INVESTING (2011) (on file with
author).
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included the recommendation that the government explore the possibility
of creating public benefit corporations.11
While the American benefit corporation has been heralded as the
innovative solution to the shareholder primacy model of governance,
many advocates tend to assume that Canadian corporate laws are one and
the same as the United States’ (U.S.) corporate laws. These advocates have
failed to compare the legal features of the American benefit corporation
alongside existing Canadian corporate laws to ensure a meaningful
alternative is offered. Canada should explore the creation of legal hybrids
that offer social enterprises with governing infrastructure to pursue dual
economic and social mandates. However, adopting the American benefit
corporation model does not make legal sense in Canada, as most of its
stakeholder-based governance features are equal to or even weaker than
Canada’s existing model of governance. This Article will explain why the
adoption of the benefit corporation in Canada is unadvisable, in hopes of
shifting energies toward more effective reform efforts in Canada.
Part I of this Article provides a brief background and description of
the American benefit corporation. Part II then delineates the Canadian
model of corporate law and governance as it currently stands in the
statutes, common law, and in practice. Part III applies the information
gathered from the previous two sections to explain why the legal features
in the American benefit corporation model are largely redundant to
existing Canadian corporate laws. It also addresses how the
implementation of the benefit corporation in Canada would conflate
incorrect assumptions on Canada’s model of governance and potentially
impede the progressive development of Canada’s corporate laws. The
Article concludes by offering suggestions to the leaders of the American
benefit corporation movement in the wake of the 2016 U.S. Presidential
election.
I. BRIEF BACKGROUND OF THE AMERICAN BENEFIT CORPORATION
The consideration of stakeholder interests has generally been
allowed in for-profit corporations under several American state laws since
the 1980s. The takeover boom saw several states implement “other
constituency” (also known as “nonshareholder constituency”12 or
“corporate constituency”13) legislation expressly permitting directors to
11. BC SOCIAL INNOVATION COUNCIL, ACTION PLAN RECOMMENDATIONS TO MAXIMIZE
SOCIAL INNOVATIONS IN BRITISH COLUMBIA 11 (2012), http://tamarackcci.ca/files/socialinnovationbc_action_plan.pdf [https://perma.cc/DWC5-6QHA].
12. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Interpreting Nonshareholder Constituency Statutes, 19 PEPP. L.
REV. 991, 973 (1992).
13. Lawrence E. Mitchell, A Theoretical and Practical Framework for Enforcing Corporate
Constituency Statutes, 70 TEX. L. REV. 579, 579–80 (1992).
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consider interests of groups in addition to shareholders in
decision-making.14 A large majority of American states are now “other
constituency” states15—only six states to date have not implemented such
legislation.16
The nonprofit B Lab began in 2008 and capitalized on the “other
constituency” statutes by creating a certification system that also requires
corporations to enshrine stakeholder interests into their governing
documents.17 The B Corporation certification is unique in this regard;
B Lab has elected to address governance issues in a way that is unrivalled
by other CSR certifications on the market. Self-imposed and privately
regulated, B Lab is attempting to establish a new kind of company that
harnesses the power of business to solve social and environmental
problems.18 At the time of this writing, the B Lab website indicates that
there are more than 1,929 certified B Corporations, including 927
American B Corporations and 160 Canadian B Corporations,19 with the
remaining number representing B Corporations originating from other
countries.20
While the numbers are sizable given the grassroots nature of the B
Corporation, they are of course small relative to the number of
corporations existing in the United States, which, according to the U.S.
Census Bureau, totals more than 27 million businesses.21 Corporations
may choose to become B Corporations so they can align themselves with
like-minded companies. The B Corporation branding may “draw in
directors committed to a blended mission and investors willing to enforce

14. For more on this, see Andrew R. Keay, Moving Towards Stakeholderism? Constituency
Statutes, Enlightened Shareholder Value and All That: Much Ado About Little? (Jan. 4, 2010)
(unpublished manuscript); Bainbridge, supra note 12; Mitchell, supra note 13.
15. Kathleen Hale, Corporate Law and Stakeholders: Moving Beyond Stakeholder Statutes, 45
ARIZ. L. REV. 823, 833 n.78 (2003).
16. Corporation Legal Roadmap, B CORPORATION, http://www.bcorporation.net/become-a-bcorp/how-to-become-a-b-corp/1061-corporation-legal-roadmap [https://perma.cc/JX3X-55B4]. The
states without non-shareholder constituency statutes are Alabama, Arkansas, Kansas, Michigan, North
Carolina, and Oklahoma.
17. Corporation Legal Roadmap, supra note 16.
18. B CORPORATION, http://www.bcorporation.net.
19. These numbers were determined using the website’s country search engine. Find a B Corp,
B CORPORATION, https://www.bcorporation.net/community/find-a-b-corp [https://perma.cc/UR86Q27B]. It should be noted that inconsistencies are likely, given that the number of B Corporations
listed on their homepage differs from the number of B Corporations listed on their B Community page
(1,929 versus 1,730). Id.
20. See Find a B Corp, supra note 19.
21. Quick Facts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/quickfacts/table/
BZA010214/00 [https://perma.cc/EX7Q-K3QZ] (this number is as of 2012; more recent statistics are
unavailable).
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it.”22 It could one day be a certification popularly recognizable by a wider
number of consumers.
Since B Lab is a private organization and does not have the authority
to manipulate existing laws, it instead works with existing laws to guide
corporations to change their framework. While it was fair to say that early
on B Lab’s focus seemed to lean toward attracting mass participation
rather than ensuring proper regulation, there have been notable changes in
its governance. In the past, B Lab was a relatively small organization that
was not equipped to regulate a large number of companies, particularly
given its additional involvement in legislative policymaking and attention
to marketing its brand.23 B Lab has since expanded in size, improved its
oversight, and collaborated with several international partners in the
pursuit of global brand recognition.
In order to become a certified B Corporation, a company is first
required to take a “B Impact Assessment” that asks questions relating to
accountability, employees, consumers, community, and the
environment.24 A corporation is “certified” by B Lab once an acceptable
score is obtained under their rating system (80 out of 200), and the
company is required to submit supporting documents for a portion of the
answers.25 B Lab relies on this self-reporting assessment and a separate
auditing system to ensure B Corporations are pursuing and achieving their
social mandates.26 Within an allotted time following certification, B
Corporations are required to amend their articles of incorporation to
require directors to consider more than just shareholder interests when
carrying out their duties.27 Companies that have benefit corporation
legislation in their states are required to adopt the benefit corporation
status within two years of certification.28 Previously, B Lab required
companies to be incorporated in an “other constituency” state, or
re-incorporate in one in order to make such amendments and be a certified
B Corporation. Now, B Lab allows companies in states that are not “other
constituency” states to simply build stakeholder interests into a signed
22. Brakman Reiser, supra note 6, at 643.
23. Find a B Corp, supra note 19.
24. Assess your Impact, B IMPACT ASSESSMENT, http://bimpactassessment.net/how-itworks/assess-your-impact [https://perma.cc/W7GG-TACY].
25. Performance Requirements, B CORPORATION, https://www.bcorporation.net/become-a-bcorp/how-to-become-a-b-corp/performance-requirements [https://perma.cc/5RCV-FBFZ].
26. For a detailed analysis of the B Impact Assessment, please see Michael Dorff, Assessing the
Assessment: B Lab’s Effort to Measure Companies’ Benevolence, 40 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 515 (2017).
27. Protect Your Mission, B CORPORATION, https://www.bcorporation.net/become-a-bcorp/why-become-a-b-corp/protect-your-mission [https://perma.cc/W3Q6-ZR7A].
28. Corporation Legal Roadmap, supra note 16. In a few states, companies are given the option
to simply amend their articles of incorporation. States that fall under this exception include Idaho,
Louisiana, and New York.
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term sheet.29 If the company’s resident state eventually creates a benefit
corporation, the company must adopt benefit corporation status within the
later of four years of the legislation or two years after certification.30
In addition to marketing its certification process, B Lab has been
influential in persuading state legislators to create benefit corporations. In
2010, the states of Maryland and Vermont each passed benefit corporation
legislation, facilitating new corporate structures designed to create both
social benefits and shareholder value.31 Maryland’s benefit corporation
laws took effect in October 201032 and Vermont’s in July 2011.33
Twenty-nine states have since followed suit with various forms of the
benefit corporation, with Delaware being a notable state that passed
legislation in 2013.34 B Lab states that seven other states are in the interim
stages of implementing legislation.35 The governing features in benefit
corporations vary somewhat from state to state, but many common
features across several of the states echo those first enacted in Maryland
and Vermont, and later in the Model Benefit Corporation Legislation;36
thus, these two states are used as the example.37
The purpose of a benefit corporation is to create a “general public
benefit,” which is defined as “a material positive impact on society and the
environment, as measured by a third-party standard, through activities that
promote some combination of specific public benefits.”38 A corporation
seeking benefit corporation status must include or make a clear a
prominent statement in its articles of incorporation that it is a benefit
corporation.39 There are no specific criteria to qualify as a benefit
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Press Release, Maryland First State in Union to Pass Benefit Corporation Legislation
(Apr. 14, 2010), http://www.csrwire.com/press_releases/29332-Maryland-First-State-in-Union-toPass-Benefit-Corporation-Legislation [https://perma.cc/LJB4-UAS9]; Vermont Becomes Second
State to Pass B Corporation Legislation Outdoor Industry Association, OUTDOOR INDUSTRY ASS’N
(June 2, 2010), https://outdoorindustry.org/article/vermont-becomes-second-state-to-pass-bcorporation-legislation/ [https://perma.cc/BVR8-58A9].
32. MD. CODE ANN., Corps. & Assn’s §§ 5-6c-01 through 5-6c-08 (West 2010).
33. Vermont Benefit Corporations Act, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21 (2011).
34. State by State Legislative Status, BENEFIT CORPORATION, http://benefitcorp.net/
policymakers/state-by-state-status [https://perma.cc/Y7U5-72UC]. For the Delaware legislation, see 8
DEL. CODE ANN. §§ 361–368 (West 2013).
35. Id.
36. Model Legislation, BENEFIT CORPORATION, http://benefitcorp.net/attorneys/modellegislation [https://perma.cc/5MP2-QMNR].
37. For a look at the differences between state statutes, please see J. Haskell Murray, Corporate
Forms of Social Enterprise: Comparing the State Statutes (Jan. 15, 2015) (unpublished manuscript),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1988556.
38. MD. CODE ANN., Corps. & Assn’s §§ 5-6c-01(c) (West 2010); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A,
§ 21.03(4) (2011).
39. MD. CODE ANN., Corps. & Assn’s §§ 5-6c-03, 5-6c-05; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.05.
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corporation so long as proper company approvals have been met, and that
also applies if a company wishes to withdraw from being a benefit
corporation. Existing state corporate laws fill any gaps in the benefit
corporation laws.
The assumed purpose behind the legal amendments required to
become a benefit corporation is to carve these corporations out of the
well-known court decision of Revlon, Inc. v MacAndrews & Forbes
Holdings, Inc.40 (Revlon). In Revlon, the Supreme Court of Delaware held
that directors owe a fiduciary duty to maximize shareholder value in
takeover contexts, regardless of nonshareholder stakeholder interests.41
The Revlon decision is generally regarded as the leading judicial precedent
in support of shareholder primacy in corporate America, and B Lab has
elected to address the matter directly. B Lab’s language to be included in
a B Corporation’s articles of incorporation requires directors to consider
various stakeholder interests.42 Obligating directors to consider

40. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
41. Id. at 182.
42. The language is as follows:
a) In discharging the duties of their respective positions and in considering the best
interests of the Company, the board of directors, committees of the board, and individual
directors shall consider the effects of any action or inaction upon:
i) the members of the Company;
ii) the employees and work force of the Company, its subsidiaries, and its
suppliers;
iii) the interests of its customers as beneficiaries of the purpose of the Company to
have a material positive impact on society and the environment;
iv) community and societal factors, including those of each community in which
offices or facilities of the Company, its subsidiaries, or its suppliers are located;
v) the local and global environment;
vi) the short-term and long-term interests of the Company, including benefits that
may accrue to the Company from its long-term plans and the possibility that these
interests may be best served by the continued independence of the Company; and
vii) the ability of the Company to create a material positive impact on society and
the environment, taken as a whole.
b) In discharging his or her duties, and in determining what is in the best interests of the
Company, a Director shall not be required to regard any interest, or the interests of any
particular group affected by such action, including the shareholders, as a dominant or
controlling interest or factor.
c) A director does not have a duty to any person other than a shareholder in its capacity
as a shareholder with respect to the purpose of the Company or the obligations set forth
in this Article, and nothing in this Article express or implied, is intended to create or
shall create or grant any right in or for any person other than a shareholder or any cause
of action by or for any person other than a shareholder [or the corporation].
d) Notwithstanding the foregoing, any director is entitled to rely on the provisions
regarding “best interests” as set forth above in enforcing his or her rights hereunder, and
under state law and such reliance shall not, absent another breach, be construed as a
breach of a director’s duty of care, even in the context of a change in control transaction
where, as a result of weighing the interests set forth in subsection (a)(i)-(vii) above
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nonshareholder stakeholders, rather than simply permitting them to do so,
is a significant legal difference. Obligatory duties hold directors to a higher
standard, and B Lab’s language has evolved considerably in the past years.
It formerly included the insertion of “as the Director deems relevant,”
which considerably softened the obligation and echoed common law. At
the time of this Article, the proposed language is far lengthier, but
similarly offers considerable softening of such obligations.43
This codification of stakeholder interests in directorial
decision-making for B Corporations is regarded by some as a significant
feature emulated by the benefit corporation laws, if not the most important
feature. In Maryland, a director is required to consider the effects of any
action or inaction on stockholders,44 employees, subsidiaries, suppliers,
customers, community and societal considerations, and the local and
global environment.45 Vermont has an additional sixth factor,
encompassing “the long-term and short-term interests of the benefit
corporation, including the possibility that those interests may be best
served by the continued independence of the benefit corporation.”46 In
contrast to the standard articulated in Revlon, this additional factor
provides substantially the same protection as offered by the B Corporation
model by relieving directors of the duties to maximize shareholder value
in a takeover situation.

[which lists certain stakeholder interests], a director determines to accept an offer,
between two competing offers, with a lower price per share.
Corporation Legal Roadmap, supra note 16.
43. Id.
44. In Maryland and certain other states, the term ‘stockholder’ is used instead of ‘shareholder.’
See MD. CODE ANN., Corps. & Assn’s § 5-6c-07(a)(1)(i) (West 2010).
45. MD. CODE ANN., Corps. & Assn’s § 5-6c-07(a)(1). Vermont has some de minimis differences
in wording. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.09(a)(1) (2011).
46. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.09(a)(1)(F). The explicit inclusion offers symbolic vindication
for Vermont, home of the socially minded ice cream business Ben & Jerry’s Homemade, Inc.
(popularly known as Ben & Jerry’s). The board of Ben & Jerry’s had multiple offers to purchase the
company in 2000, but had no choice but to sell to the highest bidder or risk a shareholder lawsuit.
News Release, Ben & Jerry’s Homemade, Inc., Ben & Jerry’s and Unilever to Join Forces in Ice Cream
(Apr. 12, 2000), http://www.benjerry.com/company/media-center/press/join-forces.html [https://
perma.cc/32BL-AGN4]; Dave Gram, States Move to Let Firms Pursue Social Mission, BOSTON
GLOBE (Apr. 11, 2010), http://archive.boston.com/news/local/vermont/articles/2010/04/11/
states_move_to_let_firms_pursue_social_mission/. But see Anthony Page & Robert A Katz, Freezing
Out Ben & Jerry: Corporate Law and the Sale of a Social Enterprise Icon, 35 VT. L. REV. 211 (2010)
(arguing that Ben & Jerry’s had strict anti-takeover defenses that their board declined to test, and that
negative reactions to the sale of social enterprises may be misguided since such sales may create more
opportunities for social enterprises to do good work). Ben & Jerry’s has since become the first wholly
owned subsidiary to become a B Corporation. Press Release, Ben & Jerry’s Joins the Growing B
Corporation Movement (Oct. 22, 2012), http://www.csrwire.com/press_releases/34773-Ben-Jerry-sJoins-the-Growing-B-Corporation-Movement [https://perma.cc/7NM9-CWKB].
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In Maryland, the director has no duty (fiduciary or otherwise) to a
person who is a general public beneficiary of the benefit corporation.47
Vermont, however, has slightly expanded the definition of fiduciary duties
for their directors. Vermont directors have fiduciary duties only to those
persons entitled to bring about a benefit enforcement proceeding against
the benefit corporation.48 A benefit enforcement proceeding means a claim
or action against a director or officer for failing to pursue the public benefit
purpose set forth in its articles of incorporation, or for violating any duty
in the statute.49 These persons have been identified as shareholders,
directors, persons, or groups of persons that own 10% or more of the equity
interests in an entity where the benefit corporation is a subsidiary, or any
other persons specified in the articles of incorporation of the benefit
corporation.50
While the expansion may seem slight, it is important. Shareholders,
and shareholders of any parent company, can bring proceedings against
the benefit corporation for violating the broader, codified stakeholder
interests.51 However, directors have the same immunity from liability as
directors of regular, for-profit corporations.52 American courts have
validated the business judgment rule, meaning that the courts will defer to
the board’s judgment so long as the directors brought an appropriate
degree of diligence in reaching a reasonable business decision at the
particular time that it was made.53 So, provided that the board’s decision is
within a range of reasonable alternatives and any actions do not constitute
fraud or negligence, the courts are unlikely to intrude upon a director’s
business judgment.
A benefit corporation is also responsible for creating an annual
benefit report, with Vermont requiring board approval prior to the report
being sent out to shareholders.54 The report is required to include: (1) a
description of how the benefit corporation pursued a public benefit during
the year and the extent to which the public benefit was created; (2) any
47. MD. CODE ANN., Corps. & Assn’s § 5-6c-07(b).
48. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, §§ 21.09(d), (e), 21.13.
49. Id. § 21.13(c).
50. Id. § 21.13(b).
51. Vermont’s expansion of duties has thus required setting out proper parameters of directors’
duties. See § 21.09(a)(3) (directors are not obligated to give priority to the interests of a particular
group or person listed under § 21.09(a)(1)); see also § 21.09(a)(4) (directors are not subject to a
different or higher standard of care when decisions may affect the control of the benefit corporation);
§ 21.09(c) (a director is not liable for the failure of a benefit corporation to create general or specific
public benefit).
52. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, §§ 21.11(d), 21.02(b) (2011).
53. Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 264 (Del. 2000) (outlining the business judgment test).
54. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.14(a), (c) (2011). MD. CODE ANN., Corps. & Assn’s
§ 5-6c-08(a) (West 2010).
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circumstances that hindered the creation of the public benefit; and (3) an
assessment of the societal and environmental performance of the benefit
corporation, prepared in accordance with a third-party standard.55
Vermont includes explicit instructions on how the report must be
constructed, such as outlining specific goals or outcomes, disclosing the
amount of compensation paid to each director, and the name of each
shareholder owning 5% or more of the shares.56 These additions add a
heightened level of transparency and accountability that echoes some of
the disclosure requirements of public companies.57 Vermont has also
created the requirement for one director of the board to be designated as a
“benefit director,” who is required to be independent and prepare an
annual statement detailing whether, in the opinion of that director, the
company acted in accordance with its benefit purpose, and if not, why.58
This statement and the annual benefit report are to be delivered and
approved by the shareholders and also posted on the company website.59
The benefit corporation is regarded as a potential alternative to
shareholder primacy to combat negative corporate behavior that may be
damaging to broader community, environmental, or other stakeholder
interests.60 Several states do not track the names and number of benefit
corporations, so it is difficult to determine how many are currently in
operation, but there are estimations putting the number at approximately
2,600 or more nationally in 2016.61
II. CANADA’S MODEL OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE62
Consistently ranked as one of the best places to live by the United
Nations Annual Human Development Report,63 Canada is an interesting
55. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.14(a). Vermont has also required a statement of the
corporation’s specific goals or outcomes, and actions the corporation has taken to attain them while
also improving its social and environmental performance. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.14(a)(1)(D).
56. Id. § 21.14(a)(4)–(7).
57. See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, §§ 21.14(b), 21.14(d); MD. CODE ANN., Corps. & Assn’s
§ 5-6c-08(b)–(c).
58. See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.10.
59. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.14(c)–(d).
60. Janine S. Hiller, The Benefit Corporation and Corporate Social Responsibility, 118 J. BUS.
ETHICS 287, 287 (2013).
61. Find a Benefit Corporation, BENEFIT CORP INFORMATION CENTER, http://benefitcorp.net/
businesses/find-a-benefit-corp [https://perma.cc/G58Z-237K]; J. Haskell Murray Presentation at the
Seattle University Law Review Symposium: Berle VIII: Benefit Corporations and the Firm
Commitment Universe (June 27–28, 2016).
62. As noted above, this Part II summarizes the findings from Carol Liao, A Canadian Model of
Corporate Governance, 37 DALHOUSIE L.J. 559 (2014) [hereinafter Liao, CFGR Study]. Much of the
language in this Part II closely tracks some portions of the CFGR study.
63. UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, UN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT,
http://hdr.undp.org/en [https://perma.cc/RW4U-HCPU] (various years).
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country in which to study the growing development of hybrid business
laws. Understanding Canada’s existing legal model of governance,
however, has its own set of challenges. Canadian directors are inundated
with American corporate governance research, leading many directors to
assume Canadian and American governance fundamentals are identical.
In fact, there are important differences found in Canadian corporate laws
that are highly relevant to the discussion of whether benefit corporations
are warranted in Canada. This Part II identifies some of Canada’s
foundational corporate laws and colors them with insights from a
qualitative study conducted by this author and sponsored by the Canadian
Foundation for Governance Research (the CFGR study), where leading
senior practitioners in Canada opined on matters involving shareholder
primacy, director duties, stakeholder interests, the courts, regulators, and
the future direction of Canadian corporate governance.64 The candid
observations from the practitioners, who provided comments in the CFGR
study on a not-for-attribution basis, reveal a surprising legal and regulatory
landscape in Canada.
A. “Best Interests of the Corporation”
Under Section 122 of the Canada Business Corporations Act
(CBCA), directors and officers are required to manage the corporation in
the “best interests of the corporation.”65 This is notably different from the
United States, where most states require directors to act in the “best
interests of the corporation and its shareholders[,]” but shareholder
interests (equating to shareholder value) are prioritized.66 The topic of the
debate, then, is whether or not the difference between “best interests of the
corporation” and “best interests of the shareholders” is simply a technical
one or if there is a noteworthy difference. In the CFGR study, a majority
of the practitioners noted how even if there was a theoretical difference it
was “largely indistinguishable” in practice because a business case could
be made that best interests of the corporation equated to that of the
shareholders.67 Others held comparably strong views on the fact that there
was a significant distinction, including one prominent practitioner, who
stated:

64. See Liao, CFGR Study, supra note 62.
65. Canada Business Corporations Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-44, s. 122 (Can.) [hereinafter CBCA]
(“[E]very director and officer of a corporation in exercising their powers and discharging their duties
shall act honestly and in good faith with a view to the best interests of the corporation” and “exercise
the care, diligence and skill that a reasonably prudent person would exercise in comparable
circumstances.”).
66. Dodge v. Ford Motor Company, 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919).
67. Liao, CFGR Study, supra note 62, at 572.
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It’s entirely different, that is not our common law….It should be a
matter of complete indifference to the directors what the interests of
the shareholders are, except if it makes a difference to the
corporation. There’s nothing wrong with taking shareholders’
interests into account, but that’s incidental….I don’t think the law
could possibly be clearer if you look at the corporate statutes and look
at what the courts have said.68

Now, this difference may only be realized in a small number of
situations, particularly mergers or acquisitions when a company is being
faced with a takeover. Nevertheless, the difference is there, certainly in
theory if not in practice. Shareholders are important stakeholders in any
corporation, and their interests are certainly not ones that boards should
take lightly, but Canadian law is clear that the board’s primary duties are
to the corporation.69
One practitioner in the CFGR study distinguished how American
jurisprudence “is more clearly articulate that the interest of the shareholder
should be foremost in the thoughts of the board in terms of maximizing
shareholder value than perhaps has been articulated historically in the
Canadian jurisprudence.”70 There is, therefore, “a slightly different focus
in Canada.”71 In terms of its application, one practitioner described it as a
“kind of continuum,” where the obligation to consider decreases as the
strength of the relationship with other constituents decreases.72 Many
practitioners expressed how one can easily make an argument that if the
corporation is acting in the best interests of all of its stakeholders, over
time the wealth of shareholders will be maximized.73 Most agreed (with a
few exceptions) that the shareholders should be the foremost priority for
directors, with other stakeholders’ interests being considered depending
on the issue at hand.74
One of the practitioners that found a stark difference between the best
interests of the corporation versus the shareholders admitted that
“certainly the entire shareholder community in Canada would say it’s all
about the shareholders, absolutely.”75 Nevertheless, the practitioner
68. Id. at 571.
69. CBCA, supra note 65.
70. Liao, CFGR Study, supra note 62, at 571.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. A number of practitioners implied that the negligible difference could become relevant in
narrow circumstances. For example, the difference could become acute in times of financial distress
or when a significant stakeholder is involved. Two practitioners gave the example of a pipeline across
the First Nations territory, where, in that scenario, the corporation should have regard to the broader
interest of stakeholders. Liao, CFGR Study, supra note 62, at 571.
75. Id.
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reiterated that doing what is in the best interests of the corporation is really
something for the directors to determine, and is not beholden to any
particular stakeholder group, including shareholders.76 When this
practitioner was informed that other participants felt that “best interests of
the corporation” and “best interests of the shareholders” were of negligible
difference, the practitioner responded:
If you are trying to advise a board in a manner that keeps them out of
harm’s way, that’s different. Providing that kind of advice,
practically speaking for a lawyer advising a client, is much different
than talking about the legal theory. Because you can have all kinds of
laws, but when you’ve got one group who is the most likely to sue
you, you tend to worry about that group…People’s sense of right and
wrong will also change over time but I don’t think the legal theory is
going to change. So it is kind of a flexible concept that can
accommodate a lot of different views of a lot of different kinds of
directors.77

A few practitioners echoed this sentiment, reflecting on how Canada
is more flexible in that it can, in any particular set of circumstances, put
the best interests of the corporation to a wider group of stakeholders.78 In
a change of control context, unlike Delaware and other states, the
Canadian board is not beholden to act as an auctioneer with the sale going
to the highest bidder. The courts have also gone on to draw a more notable
distinction in this fundamental difference in governance, as will be seen in
the subsequent sections.
B. The Oppression Remedy and Other Stakeholder Protections
There are several minority protections within Canadian corporate
law and the oppression remedy is one of Canada’s most notable
protections. The oppression remedy, set forth in Section 241 of the CBCA
and similar provincial statutes, offers a broader right of action on behalf
of certain stakeholders to apply to a court to rectify matters complained of
where:
(a) any act or omission of the corporation or any of its affiliates
effects a result,
(b) the business or affairs of the corporation or any of its affiliates
are or have been carried on or conducted in a manner, or

76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 573.
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(c) the powers of the directors of the corporation or any of its
affiliates are or have been exercised in a manner
that is oppressive or unfairly prejudicial to or that unfairly disregards
the interests of any security holder, creditor, director or officer, the
court may make an order to rectify the matters complained of.79

The oppression remedy has been acknowledged as “beyond question,
the broadest, most comprehensive and most open-ended shareholder
remedy in the common law world,”80 and this right of action goes beyond
the shareholders of a corporation. Ultimately, the remedy seeks to prevent
unfair disregard of stakeholder interests. The complainant can be a current
or former security holder, current or former director or officer, the Director
under the CBCA, or any other proper person as determined by the court.81
Courts in the past have allowed claims by creditors, certain employees,
and minority shareholders in widely held corporations to bring forth
claims, and there are indications of potential broadening under this
provision.82 If the court does find oppression, unfair prejudice, or unfair
disregard to the interests of any security holder, creditor, director or
officer, or other person, then the court “may make an order to rectify the
matters that are being complained about.”83 The test that has developed
from the courts has been one of foreseeability and reasonable expectations
that can arise through the relationship with the corporation, and these
reasonable expectations seem capable of changing over time.84
Non-monetary interests may be reasonable expectations and have been
taken into account by the courts.85
As to the kinds of remedial orders a court can make, American
counterparts are often surprised to learn how much discretion is left to the
courts. Section 241(3) of the CBCA provides a non-exhaustive list of
possible remedies available.86 Judges have commented on the breadth of
the oppression remedy and how it “gives the court tremendous latitude”
allowing a judge “to use his [or her] ingenuity to effect the remedy most

79. CBCA, supra note 65, at s. 241.
80. Stanley M. Beck, Minority Shareholders’ Rights in the 1980s, in CORPORATE LAW IN THE
80S, SPECIAL LECTURES OF THE LAW SOCIETY OF UPPER CANADA 312 (1982) (quoted in Sparling v.
Javelin Int’l Ltd. [1986] R.J.Q. 1073, 1077 (Que. S.C.) (Can.)).
81. CBCA, supra note 65, at s. 238.
82. MARKUS KOEHNEN, OPPRESSION AND RELATED REMEDIES (Carswell 2014). Koehnen
notes that the standing provisions for oppression actions in Canadian corporate law statutes are the
broadest in the common law world. Id. at 7 n.12.
83. CBCA, supra note 65, at s. 241(2).
84. Stephanie Ben-Ishai & Poonam Puri, The Canadian Oppression Remedy Judicially
Considered: 1995-2001, 30 QUEEN’S L.J. 79, 83 (2004).
85. Id. at 82.
86. CBCA, supra note 65, at s. 241(3).
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suitable to the situation.”87 Courts can set aside a transaction, make a
corporation or another person buy the oppressed party’s shares or pay
money, dissolve the corporation, or any other appropriate remedy.88 The
court has discretion to offer any appropriate remedy it wants to rectify the
oppression, and scholars have noted that Canadian courts have been rather
innovative in creating remedies for successful applicants.89
In the CFGR study, many practitioners noted that Canada is home to
several controlled companies and, as such, strong minority protection is
particularly important.90 It is easy for both founding and institutional
shareholders to be able to exert extreme pressure on boards.91 Due to those
significant players and illiquid stock, one practitioner noted how
“movement in the stock can be quite dramatic.”92 That being said, there
was overwhelming agreement that the principle of minority shareholder
protection was “baked into our corporate law.”93 Given the several options
available to minority shareholders and other stakeholders, there tended to
be consensus that in Canada, “we are well taken care of.”94 The oppression
remedy and, in the context of public companies, Multilateral Instrument
61-101 Protection of Minority Security Holders in Special Transactions
(MI 61-101)95 from the securities regulators were often cited by
practitioners as significant protections.96 Others also raised the ability to

87. See 820099 Ontario Inc. v. Harold E. Ballard Ltd. (1991), 3 B.L.R. (2d) 113, 123 (Can.).
88. CBCA, supra note 65, at s. 241.
89. Ben-Ishai & Puri, supra note 84, at 106.
90. Liao, CFGR Study, supra note 62, at 583.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. There were two notable exceptions in the group. One practitioner felt that there “is not
enough of a corporate perspective to protect the minority—it needs to go further” and “would just
prefer to see it dealt with in corporate legislation, rather than securities.” Id. at 584 n.41. Another, who
did support the principle of minority protection, felt somewhat less sympathetic towards the plight of
minority shareholders, reflecting on how “if I buy shares as a minority in a controlled corporation, I do
so knowing that it is a controlled corporation and that there’s going to be a controlling shareholder
at the end of the day.” Id.
95. Multilateral Instrument 61-101 Protection of Minority Security Holders in Special
Transactions, OSC MI 61-101, 31 OSCB 1321, (Feb. 1, 2008) [hereinafter MI 61-101].
96. Liao, CFGR Study, supra note 62, at 584.
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bring derivative actions,97 and to specific rules under the Toronto Stock
Exchange requiring minority approvals.98
In particular, a number of practitioners expressed how the minority
protection principle was “more true in Canada than in the US,” in that “we
are fairly unique” by having the concept of an oppression remedy as it
protects not only minority shareholders but other stakeholders as well.99
One commented on how the oppression remedy in the past was existing
“but only theoretically available,” whereas now it becomes an important
tool in corporate law.100 Another expressed that the remedy “really does
work” in that “it scares the majority shareholders more than anything. You
can get into court in pretty short order; courts do listen even though the
cases may have gone a lot of times the other way.”101 Regarding MI
61-101, most felt it had gone a long way toward ensuring procedural and
substantive fairness in related party transactions.102
Overall, most felt there was a good balance between the oppression
remedy and MI 61-101 in protecting minority interests.103 Reflecting on
Canada’s position, a few practitioners expressed how the strength of
Canada’s statutory remedies, some of which specifically take into account
the interests of other stakeholders, meant that Canada “cannot have a
97. A derivative action set forth under s. 239 of the CBCA and similar provincial statutes creates
a broader right of action for certain stakeholders (such as creditors), in addition to shareholders, to
bring an action on behalf of a corporation to enforce the directors’ duty to the corporation when the
directors are themselves unwilling to do so. A complainant, who may be a registered or beneficial
holder of a security (including shares and debt obligations), a director or officer or former director or
officer of the corporation, or “any other person who, in the discretion of the court, is a proper person
to make an application,” may bring an action, to enforce a right of the corporation, including rights
correlative to the duties of the officers and directors of the corporation, upon obtaining the leave of
the court. See CBCA, supra note 65, at s. 239. A few practitioners noted that, while derivative actions
were possible in Canada, they were not common and “terribly expensive to launch,” and very few
practitioners referenced this option. Others highlighted how the Toronto Stock Exchange has provided
greater protection for minority shareholders by providing majority and minority requirements for
approval of certain types of transactions, which listed companies are required to follow. Liao, CFGR
Study, supra note 62, at 585.
98. For further discussion on the role the Toronto Stock Exchange has played in Canadian
corporate governance, see Liao, CFGR Study, supra note 62, at 593.
99. Liao, CFGR Study, supra note 62, at 584.
100. Id.
101. Id. See also Ben-Ishai & Puri, supra note 84, at 81. In reviewing oppression cases in Canada,
Ben-Ishai and Puri contend that Canadian courts have applied the remedy in a way that reflects the
primacy of shareholder interests and nexus of contracts model in corporate law. However, the
increasing success of creditors as non-shareholder applicants pointed to a possible change in attitude
by the courts. Ben-Ishai and Puri suggest the cautious approach by the courts is likely to continue in
the near future.
102. There was an exception made by one practitioner, who felt that the rule did not prevent
enough transactions that some would consider abusive because “it simply becomes a kind of formula
to get through” and therefore in many instances “it just degenerates into a process.” Liao, CFGR Study,
supra note 62, at 585.
103. Id.
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model that is a hundred percent shareholder primacy.”104 Clearly, there are
built-in principles in Canadian common law designed to protect minority
shareholders from exploitation at the hands of controlling shareholders.
While there were some nuances as to how effective certain protections
were in practice,105 the general sentiment amongst practitioners was that
minority shareholder protections are well supported in Canadian statutory
and common law rules, and that Canada also offers statutory protections
to other stakeholders beyond shareholders.106 As seen in the following
section, these qualities have recently been highlighted by our highest
court.
C. Common Law and Stakeholder Interests
Landmark decisions by the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) have
emphasized the statutory differences between Canada and the United
States regarding stakeholder interests, causing many practitioners to
inform boards that they can—and indeed should—take into account
nonshareholder value issues. Stakeholder interests may have always had a
role in governance under Canadian statutory laws, but the courts have now
generated a need for boards to document their process of considering those
interests.
The 2004 case of Peoples Department Stores Inc. (Trustee of)
v. Wise107 stimulated several responses from legal professionals and
scholars on its significance to the future of Canadian corporate
governance.108 In brief, after the bankruptcy of the Peoples Department
Stores Inc., the trustee brought an action against the company’s directors
for breaching their fiduciary duties; prior to the bankruptcy, the company
directors implemented a credit scheme that favored Peoples’ parent
company, Wise Stores Inc., over its creditors.109 Regarding the “best
interests of the corporation,” the SCC stated:
104. Id.
105. For example, one practitioner in the CFGR study pointed to some limitations in the
oppression remedy. It is only available against shareholders that own more than 50% of the company
and a claimant also has to be an affiliate of the company to be a proper defendant. Since there are
many Canadian companies controlled by 40%–45% of shareholders, the practitioner felt that the
remedy had more limited use than one would assume. Id.
106. Id.
107. Peoples Department Stores Inc. (Trustee of) v. Wise, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 461 (Can.).
108. Readers are encouraged to review the several summaries and analyses that are available.
See, e.g., Catherine Francis, Peoples Department Store Inc. v. Wise: The Expanded Scope of Directors’
and Officers’ Fiduciary Duties and Duty of Care, 41 CAN. BUS. L.J. 175 (2005); Edward Iacobucci,
Indeterminacy and the Canadian Supreme Court’s Approach to Corporate Fiduciary Duties, 48 CAN.
BUS. L.J. 232 (2009); Darcy L MacPherson, Supreme Court Restates Directors’ Fiduciary Duty – A
Comment on Peoples Department Stores v. Wise, 43 ALTA L. REV. 383 (2005).
109. Peoples Department Stores Inc., 3 S.C.R., at para. 17.
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[I]t is clear that the phrase the “best interests of the corporation”
should be read not simply as the “best interests of the
shareholders.”. . . [I]n determining whether they are acting with a
view to the best interests of the corporation it may be legitimate,
given all the circumstances of a given case, for the board of directors
to consider, inter alia, the interests of shareholders, employees,
suppliers, creditors, consumers, governments and the environment.110

The court cited with approval the 1972 case of Teck Corp. v. Millar,
in which it was held that if directors “observe a decent respect for other
interests lying beyond those of the company’s shareholders in the strict
sense, that will not . . . leave directors open to the charge that they have
failed in their fiduciary duty to the company.”111 Peoples also marked the
first instance where the court specifically validated the business judgment
rule.112
The Supreme Court took it a step further in its highly anticipated
2008 decision in BCE Inc. v. 1976 Debentureholders.113 The court
affirmed Peoples and appeared to further temper the shareholder primacy
norm.114 In brief, debenture holders of Bell Canada, a subsidiary of BCE
Inc., used the oppression remedy to seek relief concerning the privatization
of BCE by a consortium of private equity buyers under a plan of
arrangement that had been determined by BCE’s directors to be in the best
interests of BCE and its shareholders. Upon the completion of the
arrangement, the debenture holders stood to lose approximately twenty
percent of the short-term trading value of their holdings. The SCC again
found that directors may look to other stakeholders and also those directors
were “not confined to short-term profit or share value,” but “[w]here the
corporation is an ongoing concern, it looks to long-term interests of the
corporation.”115 Furthermore, the court found that when conflicts arise,

110. Id., at para. 42.
111. Teck Corp v. Millar, [1972] 33 DLR (3d) 288, 2 W.W.R. 385 (BCSC) para. 97 (Can.).
112. Peoples Department Stores Inc., 3 S.C.R., at paras. 64–65.
113. BCE Inc. v. 1976 Debentureholders, [2008] 3 S.C.R. 560 (Can.).
114. Readers are again invited to review the summaries and analyses available for greater details
on the case. See, e.g., Jeffrey Bone, The Supreme Court Revisiting Corporate Accountability: BCE
Inc. In Search of a Legal Construct Known as the ‘Good Corporate Citizen’, ALTA. L. REV. ONLINE
SUPPLEMENT, http://www.albertalawreview.com/index.php/alr/supplement/view/BCE-in-search-ofgood-corporate-citizen; Sarah P Bradley, BCE Inc. v. 1976 Debentureholders: The New Fiduciary
Duties of Fair Treatment, Statutory Compliance, and Good Corporate Citizenship?, 41 OTTAWA L.
REV. 325 (2010); Mohammad Fadel, BCE and the Long Shadow of American Corporate Law, 48 CAN.
BUS. L.J. 190 (2009); J Anthony VanDuzer, BCE v. 1976 Debentureholders: The Supreme Court’s
Hits and Misses in its Most Important Corporate Law Decision Since Peoples, 43 U. B.C. L. Rev. 205
(2009).
115. BCE Inc., 3 S.C.R., at para. 38. (regarding the oppression remedy, the court found there
was no violation by the directors in their fiduciary duties).
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…it falls to the directors of the corporation to resolve them in
accordance with their fiduciary duty to act in the best interests of the
corporation. The cases on oppression, taken as a whole, confirm that
this duty comprehends a duty to treat individual stakeholders affected
by corporate actions equitably and fairly. There are no absolute rules
and no principle that one set of interests should prevail over
another. In each case, the question is whether, in all the
circumstances, the directors acted in the best interests of the
corporation, having regard to all relevant considerations, including —
but not confined to — the need to treat affected stakeholders in a fair
manner, commensurate with the corporation’s duties as a
responsible corporate citizen. Where it is impossible to please all
stakeholders, it will be irrelevant that the directors rejected alternative
transactions that were no more beneficial than the chosen one.116

The court did not go further in describing its concept of corporate
citizenry, so the concept’s legal viability remains to be seen. The court also
reinforced its support for the business judgment rule.117
In many ways, the BCE decision added confusion surrounding
directors’ duties, particularly on whether directors may, should, or are
obligated to consider stakeholder interests. It is simply unclear from the
decision whether this is a mandatory duty, as some parts of the judgment
indicate that it is permissive and others imply that it is required.118 Thus,
in an attempt to see if there was some consensus among the group of
leading Canadian practitioners in the CFGR study, all were asked the
question: “Do you believe directors may, should, or are obligated to
consider stakeholder interests?”119
Several practitioners did not commit to one option, but chose two
(such as “between may and should” or “they should and they are obligated
to”). On the continuum of ‘may’ being the least restrictive for directors,
and ‘obligated’ being the most, where the most restrictive answer was used
as the recorded answer of the practitioner, 44% of practitioners said
116. Id., at para. 81–83 (emphasis added).
117. Id., at para. 40.
118. See, e.g., Ed Waitzer & Johnny Jaswal, Peoples, BCE, and the Good Corporate “Citizen,”
47 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 439, 461 (2009). Regarding the decision, Waitzer and Jaswal noted how:
Even the questions of whether directors may consider, should consider, or are obliged to
consider stakeholder interests, and, if so, at what point, were not addressed clearly by the
Court. Early in its reasons, it noted that, in Peoples, “this Court found that although
directors must consider the best interests of the corporation, it may also be appropriate,
although not mandatory, to consider the impact of corporate decisions on shareholders or
particular groups of stakeholders”. Later, the Court stated that ‘the duty of directors to act
in the best interests of the corporation comprehends a duty to treat individual
stakeholders… equitably and fairly.’ Is this duty mandatory?
Id.
119. Liao, CFGR Study, supra note 62, at 581.
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directors were obligated to consider stakeholder interests, 40% felt that
directors should consider them, and 16% felt directors may consider
them.120 However, even in circumstances where one believed the law
requires less than obligatory consideration, several practitioners
recommended caution on the matter, saying “it’s an easy test to meet and
it’s a foolish test to fail.”121 One practitioner in particular pointed out that
“if you don’t pay attention to a stakeholder interest, then you are left
defending yourself saying, ‘I didn’t have an obligation to do it.’”122 The
practitioner went on to state:
Why not just pay attention to it and then decide to dismiss it? This is
where we get caught up in process so much as lawyers. It’s just a
safer thing to do. Turn your mind to it. Decide if it’s important then
move on. Our job is to protect our clients and so, it’d just be crazy for
us to say, ‘you don’t have to consider that.’ It’s much safer to say,
‘Consider it, balance it, then decide what you think is the right thing
to do.’123

Most found that there was little change to corporate decision-making
subsequent to BCE, and a handful felt that this was because Canadian
corporate law had already progressed to incorporating stakeholder
interests through the oppression remedy and “best interests of the
corporation,” among other things. It may be that in the past “it just wasn’t
as open a discussion” as one practitioner put it,124 but the consideration of
stakeholder interests is a very live issue in Canadian corporate governance
practices.
In the aftermath of BCE, practitioners cited a range of reasons why
directors should consider stakeholder interests, including the business case
for doing so, to simply play it safe given the ambiguity of Canada’s legal
position on the matter, and concerns regarding the oppression remedy.125
While Peoples and BCE are somewhat unclear as to whether or not the
consideration of stakeholder interests is a mandatory requirement,
practitioners have been advising boards to document their consideration
of stakeholder interests since the effort is minimal enough when weighed
against the risks. The ambiguity has resulted in an interpretation that
favors less risk. Thus, it seems that not only has the consideration of
stakeholder interests in Canada been calcified in board practice but so has
the act of documenting such consideration.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 582.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
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D. The Impact of the Securities Regulators
Despite the fact that Canadian statutes and common law have tended
to favor a more stakeholder-based governance model, Canadian legislators
and the courts have often taken a backseat in the development of corporate
governance standards. Eliciting legislative change is an extremely slow
progression and corporate legislation operates on a jurisdictional basis.
Substantial corporate cases in Canada are also few and far between,
meaning Canadian courts do not have the instrumentalities to promote
good behavior. Whether by choice or through the process of elimination,
the securities commissions are now playing a major role in shaping
Canadian corporate governance practices. By virtue of the fact that the
securities commissions have a ‘public interest’ jurisdiction to protect the
capital markets,126 and by design are investor-focused, their influence has
pushed Canadian public companies toward a more shareholder-centric
model of governance.
It is a curious Canadian phenomenon that the securities regulators
are significantly affecting the corporate legal sphere. Practitioners in the
CFGR study recounted how extraordinarily controversial it was more than
a decade ago when the securities regulators initially began encroaching on
a space that was traditionally for the legislatures and the courts.127 Now,
people seem to have moved past the notion that the securities commissions
are overstepping their jurisdiction and have generally accepted the
regulators’ role in shaping Canadian corporate governance. Since the
Canadian Securities Administrators (CSA) are able to act on a coordinated
basis across the nation, the organization has become a very convenient
place to deal with change. Institutional investors deliberately seek out the
CSA to enhance shareholder rights, even if, from a philosophical
perspective, corporate legislation is the more appropriate venue.
Practitioners in the CFGR study cited some notable disadvantages to
having the regulators dominate corporate governance in Canada. Several
pointed to the fact that the commissions have often disregarded findings
from the courts, are not well-versed in evidentiary rules, and often fail to
establish principles that can guide lower courts.128 A few felt that there was
no need for securities regulators to interfere with the carefully engineered
corporate structure, with one practitioner voicing the common sentiment
that “what’s in the best interest of the shareholder doesn’t align with better
governance—that’s where [the practice] falls down.”129

126. Securities Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S-5, s. 127(1), para 3 (Can.).
127. Liao, CFGR Study, supra note 62, at 590.
128. Id. at 592.
129. Id.
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Overall, the practitioners’ viewpoints in terms of the appropriateness
of the commissions’ role in governance tended to vary. The majority of
practitioners felt the regulators were “better than the alternative.”130 For
example, a few practitioners noted how the Alberta Securities
Commission has been quite effective in reform, commenting on how their
past involvement in the National Policy 58-201 Corporate Governance
Guidelines131 has helped increase the overall quality of corporate
governance in Canada. Absent the securities commissions establishing
rules and guidelines and the courts enforcing them, Canada would not have
the robust system that exists today. Another pointed out that the
commissions have probably gone as far as they can in the governance
sphere, and “having got to that point, nobody’s going to come out today
and say, oh get rid of all that, it doesn’t do anything.”132 Some pointed to
how the commissions have “been a positive in creating more fairness in
transactions” under MI 61-101.133 Whether the practitioners agreed or
disagreed with what the securities commissions did generally, many
conceded that the regulators are “knowledgeable and better equipped” than
governmental or judicial bodies in the field, and the courts are helpful in
providing outside constraints when the securities commissions” become a
little bit too zealous.”134
E. The Future of Canadian Corporate Law
In the CFGR study, practitioners’ views on Canada’s overall model
of governance tended to depend in large part on what each practitioner
found most compelling: the constancy of the corporate statutes and
trajectory of the common law, or the power and influence held by the
securities regulators.135 Leaving aside change of control transactions for
the moment, the building blocks of Canadian corporate law have some
notable differences when compared to the academic definition of
Anglo-American shareholder primacy, and common law developments
have emphasized those differences. The legislation requires management
to act in the “best interests of the corporation” while the oppression
remedy and other minority protections are fused into our statutes and
common laws. Taken with the 2004 Peoples decision and the 2008 BCE
decision, practitioners tended to agree that Canadian corporate law has
130. Id. at 591.
131. See National Policy 58-201 Corporate Governance Guidelines, ONTARIO SEC. COMM’N,
http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/documents/en/Securities-Category5/rule_20050617_58-201_corp-govguidelines.pdf [https://perma.cc/886X-VQJ9].
132. Liao, CFGR Study, supra note 62, at 591.
133. Id. at 591–92.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 597.
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“overtones of a broader stakeholder model.”136 One practitioner put it
succinctly:
In fact, the shareholders do not have primacy in the corporate context
in Canada, although directors generally think that they do. It’s a very
difficult distinction that the Canadian courts made based upon our
corporate statutes and it’s a very difficult distinction to explain to
boards of directors.137

And perhaps this difficult distinction may be why many practitioners
in the CFGR study tended to keep those nuances in a Canadian model
limited to boilerplate provisions. Several practitioners found the
differences in Canadian law compelling and important, but the majority
found the practical impact of these differences largely boiled down to a
change of the process in corporate decision-making only.138 Indeed, as one
practitioner commented, “the areas of distinction between Canada and
U.S. that’s recognized by high-end M&A corporate lawyers in Canada
probably isn’t recognized anywhere else.”139 Another practitioner found
the distinction to be due to the fact that “the Canadian public, in my mind,
is so influenced by the U.S. experience, the U.S. media, and U.S.
information that it doesn’t even know whether the law in Canada is the
same or different.”140 For many practitioners, de-emphasizing the
difference does little to no harm; from a legal standpoint, keeping the focus
on ensuring the process is complied with, even if one ends up with the
same answer, is a far less controversial route.
The conflicting theoretical positions from the courts and the
securities commissions have enriched the dialogue on the current
environment of Canadian corporate governance. One practitioner
expressed how “we’re still digesting the BCE decision—we’ve got a ways
to go” and another wondered if Canada is experiencing “an overture in
decisions.”141 While most felt that Canadian governance norms and culture
are becoming quite well-developed, the frequent pull in different
directions from the regulators and influential power sources in Canada has
left Canadian governance in a “period of uncertainty . . . we’re still trying
to figure out what the model should be.”142 Corporate statutes have not
changed, but power dynamics can shift. The rise of board education and
influence has created more robust mechanisms to govern corporations,
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 598.
142. Id.
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while the mobilization of collective action by shareholder advisory groups,
like the Canadian Coalition for Good Governance and the Institutional
Shareholder Services Inc., has meant that that the institutional investors in
Canada are a significant force to be reckoned with.143
Canadian common law has made the process of considering
stakeholders in the best interests of the corporation more overt, well
beyond what is assumed in Anglo-American corporate legal scholarship.
Layered onto this corporate legal base, the securities commissions have
provided other measures to bolster the field of corporate governance in
Canada while seeking to protect the integrity of the capital markets and
the interests of investors within those markets. These efforts, along with
those from other organizations, have raised and normalized governance
standards, created more robust checks and balances, and helped to develop
a stronger voice in the corporate governance movement within the last
several decades of Canadian history.
In summary, with respect to the directors’ consideration of
stakeholder interests specifically, these considerations are already required
under Canadian laws. The directors’ duties to the “best interests of the
corporation” and strong minority stakeholder protections have already
codified the importance of stakeholder considerations in Canadian
statutes. For anyone that was doubtful of the impact of these existing laws,
the decisions by the Supreme Court of Canada in Peoples and BCE have
confirmed the notion that boards are to consider stakeholder interests in
their decision-making. Indeed, leading practitioners across Canada have
acknowledged that they are continually advising their clients to record
evidence of the consideration of stakeholder interests, implementing a
documentation process beyond what is required under the laws to better
protect their clients from liability risks.
Since BCE, there has been a notable shift in the debates in Canadian
corporate governance. Leading corporate law textbooks in Canada have
been updated and revised to reflect the changing governance landscape
after the SCC decisions.144 The theme of the National Conference of the
Institute of Corporate Directors, representing more than 9,000 directors
across Canada, in 2012 was “Sustainable Development: Embracing
Environmental, Social and Geopolitical Challenges Responsibly.”145
143. Id.
144. See POONAM PURI ET AL., CASES, MATERIALS AND NOTES ON PARTNERSHIPS AND
CANADIAN BUSINESS CORPORATIONS (Thomson Reuters, 6th ed. 2016). The upcoming 2nd edition
of ROBERT YALDEN ET AL., BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS: PRINCIPLES, POLICIES AND PRACTICE is also
being revised to account for those decisions and the shift in the Canadian governance landscape (this
author is a co-author to the 2nd edition).
145. Press Release, Sustainable Development the Focus of 2nd Annual Institute of Corporate
Directors National Conference, https://www.icd.ca/About-the-ICD/Media-Centre/ICD-News/Press-
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These examples are but a few. The path that the common law is embarking
upon is uncharted, and while practitioners continue to wrestle with the
ramifications of the BCE decision, one thing seems certain: the Supreme
Court of Canada has taken the concept of shareholder primacy and has
stood it on its head.
III. WHY CANADA SHOULD NOT ADOPT THE BENEFIT CORPORATION
The implementation of a benefit corporation in Canada, when
compared to several of the findings in Part II, raises some immediate
concerns regarding redundancy when compared to Canadian corporate
laws. The most significant legal innovation in the American benefit
corporation is the requirement that directors consider stakeholder interests
in their decision-making.146 This feature echoes what is already available
under Canadian laws, specifically under the requirement that directors
manage the corporation in the “best interests of the corporation,” the
oppression remedy, and findings from the Peoples and BCE decision
regarding the consideration of stakeholder interests.147 Indeed, as indicated
by the practitioners, the effect of the BCE decision has made this particular
requirement to consider stakeholder interests much more potent, as
directors feel the pressure to document and record evidence of the process
they took to consider stakeholders’ interests in their decisions.148 On this
requirement alone, the Canadian model of governance is already more
stringent than this legal offering by the benefit corporation.
Numerous practitioners in the CFGR study cited how, in practice, the
“best interests of the corporation” and consideration of stakeholders leads,
more often than not, to the same conclusion that would be reached if
directors’ fiduciary duties were solely for the shareholders’ best
interests.149 This would certainly be the case under the auspices of a benefit
corporation as well, given the business case for considering stakeholders
in order to improve long-term corporate performance. There are also those
who would argue that the benefit corporation is better equipped to pursue
a social value mandate when this pursuit runs against economic interests
of the company. This may be correct, but not for reasons that have
anything to do with the construction of the corporate laws. Flexibility in
corporate decision-making in Canada was not lost on the senior
practitioners in the CFGR study. The board is not confined to short-term
Releases/Sustainable-Development-The-Focus-Of-2nd-Annual-In.aspx [https://perma.cc/H5Z439T6].
146. See supra text accompanying note 42.
147. BCE Inc. v. 1976 Debentureholders, [2008] 3 S.C.R. 560 (Can.); Peoples Department Stores
Inc. (Trustee of) v. Wise, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 461 (Can.).
148. Liao, CFGR Study, supra note 62, at 579.
149. Id. at 572–73.
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profit or share value, nor required to consider only shareholders’ interests.
The board does not simply act as an auctioneer in the face of a takeover
bid, as per Revlon in the United States,150 but is required to determine what
is in the best interests of the corporation. As for what equates to the best
interests of the corporation, that is up to the directors to determine. The
SCC also specifically validated the business judgment rule in Peoples and
BCE.151 This is in addition to the SCC’s comment that directors are to look
to the best interests of the corporation “viewed as a good corporate
citizen.”152 If there is any legal import to be taken behind those words (and
one day, there may), then in that sense, all Canadian corporations should
be acting as benefit corporations.
There is also a need here to point out the differences from a private
versus public company standpoint. A private corporation in Canada that
falls outside the purview of the securities regulators has little to fear in
pursuing a dual mandate. In its simplest form, as one practitioner put it,
“that person can be the shareholder, director, president, and chief bottle
washer . . . their interests are aligned with the company’s interest so the
better the company does, the better they do.”153 Closely held companies
can pursue whatever mandate they want without conflict if there is
agreement, and indeed, several practitioners in the CFGR study practicing
in the private company sphere were clear that these companies had great
flexibility to pursue profit-maximizing goals, corporate social
responsibility, and entirely philanthropic and/or social goals, among other
things. If a company elects to expand its shareholder base and cultivates
it, there is little concern in pursuing a dual mission of economic and social
value in its corporate pursuits.154 Provided that the board’s decision is
within a range of reasonable alternatives, the court will always defer to
that judgment. Directors pursuing dual mandates are well-protected under
Canadian corporate laws.

150. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, (Del. 1986).
151. BCE Inc., 3 S.C.R., at para. 40; Peoples Department Stores Inc., 3 S.C.R., at paras. 64–67.
152. BCE Inc., 3 S.C.R., at para. 66.
153. Liao, CFGR Study, supra note 62 (unpublished notes with the author).
154. For added comfort, directors may be constrained using several legal tools to ensure the
continuance of a social objective. As one practitioner noted:
In a private corporation, you can put all kinds of constraints on the directors. You can use
a unanimous shareholders’ agreement or constrain them in the articles and bylaws and say,
‘Look, we’re the six shareholders and we don’t want you to leverage this company over
this ratio, and we’re going to stick that in the bylaws….We’re going to put a passage in the
shareholder’s agreement that you can’t do that,’ and they can’t. The shareholders are able
to step in the place of directors in a private company all they want.
Id. The practitioner went on to note this is not the case in a public company as the shareholders will
keep changing. See id.
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On the other hand, it is much harder for public companies to move
away from focusing on shareholders’ interests, which most often translates
to meaning an increase in share value. This is due to a variety of reasons,
including general competitive business pressures—directors are under
much higher scrutiny and institutional shareholders hold considerable
influence, among other things. These pressures tend to force companies to
be drawn to the short-term bottom line, which, at times, is to a company’s
own detriment,155 and there have been movements, led by organizations
that hold considerable weight in Canada, to combat this type of short-term
behavior.156 Because the question being examined is in regard to the added
value of implementing benefit corporation legislation in Canada, there do
not seem to be any added legal features in the benefit corporation that
would combat any of the pressures that exist for the regular Canadian
public corporation. The Model Benefit Corporation Legislation requires a
benefit director to be on the publicly traded benefit corporation’s board—
which one would assume is only meant to identify the specific tasks
beholden to the benefit director and not the inherent reflection of a unique
intent behind the benefit director’s decision-making, as all directors are
beholden to their fiduciary duties.157 Other than this feature, there are
currently no other protections offered to support the social benefit side of
the benefit corporation in a public company context. The legislation is not
equipped to counter the pressures that public companies face in the global
capital markets. Section D of Part II touched upon how Canada’s legal and
regulatory landscape is in a theoretical conflict with the securities
commissions, which have a significant voice in governance practices. By
nature, these regulations are designed to protect shareholders, and
shareholders’ approvals on governance matters have grown considerably
in the last few decades. Public benefit corporations would still be subject
to rules regarding takeover bids and defensive tactics, including any sort
of amendments. Benefit corporations would have the exact same issues as
all other public companies in that regard.
As noted in Part I, Vermont’s legislation does specifically state that
directors, in considering the long-term and short-term interests of the
benefit corporation, may determine that those interests “may be best
155. See, e.g., John R. Graham, Campbell R. Harvey & Shivaram Rajgopal, Value Destruction
and Financial Reporting Decisions, 62 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 27 (2006).
156. A few practitioners in the CFGR study mentioned the joint initiative between Mark
Wiseman, the President and CEO of the Canadian Pension Plan Investment Board, and Dominic
Barton, the Global Managing Director of McKinsey & Company, entitled Focusing Capital on the
Long Term. See Dominic Barton & Mark Wiseman, Focusing Capital on the Long Term, HARV. BUS.
REV., Jan.–Feb. 2014.
157. This is reflected in the model benefit corporation legislation, but not necessarily in every
state benefit corporation’s laws. See Model Legislation, supra note 36.
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served by the continued independence of the benefit corporation.”158 The
added statement may offer some solace if directors are particularly
struggling in their decision and fear certain ramifications in the face of a
takeover bid. From a corporate theorist’s perspective, the added statement
is not necessary as directors already have that right under Canadian laws.
Practitioners in the CFGR study elaborated on how in select
circumstances, even in a public company context, an alternative decision
other than the highest bid offer, though rare, is already feasible in
Canada.159 Legal advisors would simply not recommend testing the
parameters unless the conditions were right, but that is beside the point.
There may be business reasons for inserting this language beyond what is
necessary in the law, and that is understandable. It is just unclear if
corporate legislation is the appropriate place for it as opposed to
contractual means, as the board discretion already exists in Canada, and
regardless, takeovers in a public company context would still be subject to
the usual takeover bid rules issued by the securities regulators.
When the stakeholder requirements are stripped away from the
benefit corporation structure, the remaining legal elements seem
somewhat bare. The requirement that a benefit corporation create “a
general public benefit measured by a third-party standard” seems
impressive at first glance, but a cursory glance at the benefit corporations
listed on the Benefit Corporation Information Center’s directory indicates
that there are would be very few businesses that consider themselves
excluded from this standard.160 How does the sale of pastries, for example,
provide a general public benefit? How does a regular cleaning business
(with no mention of anything publicly beneficial on its website, not even
eco-cleaning supplies) create a public benefit? 161 One practitioner in the
CFGR study mentioned Coca-Cola’s somewhat counterintuitive campaign
to fight obesity.162 Could Coca-Cola be a benefit corporation? The
“third-party standard” measure seems to be a low one. Any corporation
that has embraced the CSR movement and adopted some form of CSR
practices in their business can become a benefit corporation. Benefit
corporations also have no legal features to combat the limitations in
CSR. Empirical studies have shown that CSR trends have been
consistent with theories of strategic CSR and rational, profit-seeking
158. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.09(F) (2011).
159. Liao, CFGR Study, supra note 62, at 580.
160. Find a Benefit Corporation, supra note 61.
161. This is not meant to single this company out, as it was one of several benefit corporations
that had little evidence of any general or specific public benefit on its website.
162. Coming Together: Help Us Fight Obesity, COCA-COLA CO., http://www.cocacolacompany.com/press-center/press-releases/the-coca-cola-company-reinforces-its-commitment-tohelp-america-in-the-fight-against-obesity [https://perma.cc/T96X-QZTN].
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management decision-making.163 “Greenwashing”—where companies
spend significantly more time and money on green advertising rather than
on environmentally sound practices—is a real concern.164 There are no
built-in legal mechanisms to prevent this type of corporate behavior in a
benefit corporation beyond what is already available for regular Canadian
corporations.
The trouble is that the benefit corporation’s definition of a “general
public benefit” fits perfectly into the dogma that has been at the core of
modern economics since Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations, where he
famously opined: “It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the
brewer, or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to
their own interest.”165 Smith’s concept of the ‘invisible hand’ has
resonated within the theoretical economic underpinnings of the
corporation for some time now. It postulates that shareholders have
powerful incentives to maximize the value of the firm and monitor
corporate directors’ and officers’ conduct. Managers, as shareholders’
agents, seek to maximize shareholder wealth through the increase of share
value and dividend payments, which presumably includes ensuring that
stakeholders are appeased166 and ultimately translates into benefits to
consumers and society as a whole. Charles Elson, an advocate of
shareholder primacy in the U.S., stated: “It’s politically correct to suggest
that a company benefit the public rather than its investors. But investors
are the public.”167 If indeed the proponents behind the benefit corporation
believe the hybrid is offering something clearly different from the
mainstream corporation, and presumably they do, their legal features need
to be more explicit and set them apart from the classic economic definition
of how business translates to public benefit. Of course, benefit
corporations also have the option to include the requirement to produce a
“specific public benefit” in their governing documents —but so can a
regular Canadian corporation.
The last two elements of the benefit corporation to be discussed
briefly are its benefit enforcement proceedings and its annual reporting
163. See, e.g., Donald Siegel & Donald Vitaliano, An Empirical Analysis of the Strategic Use of
Corporate Social Responsibility, 16 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 773 (2007); Ronald Fisman,
Geoffrey Heal & Vinay Nair, A Model of Corporate Philanthropy (Columbia Business School,
Working Paper No. 1331, 2007).
164. See, e.g., Lorianne D. Mitchell & Wesley D. Ramey, Look How Green I Am! An Individuallevel Explanation for Greenwashing, 12(6) J. APPLIED BUS. & ECON. 40 (2011).
165. ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS
18 (Edwin Cannan ed., Chi. Univ. Press 1977) (1776).
166. See, e.g., REINIER KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A
COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH, 61–66 (Oxford University Press, 2nd ed. 2009).
167. Angus Loten, Can Firms Aim to Do Good if It Hurts Profit?, WALL ST. J., Apr. 11, 2013,
at B6.
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requirements. As discussed in Part I, directors in a benefit corporation have
fiduciary duties only to those persons entitled to bring about a benefit
enforcement proceeding against the benefit corporation. As seen in
Section B of Part II, the benefit enforcement proceeding is less stringent
than the Canadian oppression remedy, which is available to stakeholders
against majority shareholders, and through derivative actions claims
which can be made against directors for violating their duties to the
corporation. This is in addition to protections under MI 61-101 in a public
company context.168 The legislation does indicate that proceedings can be
brought against directors for failing to pursue a public benefit, but as
earlier stated, there are inherent problems with the definition of public
benefit, thus it would seem unlikely anyone would be able to bring a valid
claim under that provision that would not already be captured under other
tortious claims.
The annual benefit reporting requirement is certainly something that
is not required of Canadian private companies. Public companies have
their own disclosure requirements that presumably would capture much of
the content within the benefit corporation’s reporting requirements, but
private companies do not have ‘benefit’ reporting requirements.
Therefore, this legal feature does offer something that private Canadian
companies seeking to pursue both economic and social value are not
required to implement. However, it remains to be seen whether annual
benefit reporting will include disclosures more substantial than puff pieces
provided by the businesses to promote their brand as ‘good’ companies.
Overall, there is a concern that the benefit corporation may resort to
a branding exercise if it is implemented in Canada. The value likely lies in
the marketing and branding for ‘do-gooding’ corporations, not in making
any legal sense as a distinct alternative to the mainstream corporate model.
There are no meaningful teeth behind the benefit corporation legislation,
and its offerings to Canadian corporate law are minimal. In fact, some of
its standards are weaker, such as the minority protection statutes, which
pale in comparison to Canada’s oppression remedy. Even worse, the
adoption of the benefit corporation may only confuse or misrepresent the
current state of Canadian corporate law. If the hybrid is regarded as a clear
alternative to the mainstream corporate model, there is a risk that
entrepreneurs may erroneously think that they are not able to pursue both
social and economic value in their businesses without running some sort
of legal risk. That would hinder the very social goals that leaders behind
the benefit corporation are presumably trying to achieve.

168. See MI 61-101, supra note 95.
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Of late, the Canadian federal government has made some significant
moves to foster the burgeoning field of social enterprises. In 2016, the
Ministry of Innovation, Science, and Economic Development provided the
following definition on its website: “A social enterprise seeks to achieve
social, cultural or environmental aims through the sale of goods and
services. The social enterprise can be for-profit or not-for-profit but the
majority of net profits must be directed to a social objective with limited
distribution to shareholders and owners.”169 At the same time, the federal
government began the development of a national Social Enterprises
Directory on its Canadian Company Capabilities database.170
Organizations that self-identify as social enterprises based on the
Ministry’s definition are permitted to register and be featured on the
directory.
The definition provided by the federal government is, in most all
respects, a higher standard of expectation on what constitutes a social
enterprise when compared to the benefit corporation. Benefit corporations
have no obligation to direct their net profits to a social objective. While
their purpose is to create a “general public benefit,” as aforementioned this
broad definition can apply to a wide variety of businesses with little
change to the status quo, and there are no restrictions on the amounts that
boards can declare as dividends to their shareholders. How many current
benefit corporations would fall under the ambit of Canada’s definition of
social enterprise? In providing a definition, the Canadian government has
gone ahead and raised the bar on what kind of businesses should be
self-labelling as social enterprises. This is how Canada is choosing to
address this burgeoning field, and these are early days.
There are good reasons for Canada to wait and see how the benefit
corporation fares in the longer term. Indeed, discussions are bubbling up
in the United States as more practitioners are beginning to pay attention to
the benefit corporation in states with “other constituency” statutes, among
other nuances in its corporate laws.171 This author suggests patience,
further research, and a willingness from Canadian social leaders backing
the benefit corporation to better understand the state of Canadian corporate
governance and its trajectory given recent court decisions and emerging
business megatrends. The American benefit corporation movement is
designed to address American corporate governance needs for corporate
169. Directory of Canadian Social Enterprises, GOV’T CAN., http://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/
site/ccc_bt-rec_ec.nsf/eng/h_00016.html [https://perma.cc/L3MF-6KK3] (emphasis added).
170. Id.
171. Noam Noked, Benefit Corporations vs. “Regular” Corporations: A Harmful Dichotomy,
HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (May 13, 2012), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/
corpgov/2012/05/13/benefit-corporations-vs-regular-corporations-a-harmful-dichotomy/
[https://perma.cc/D69K-78AX].
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reform and social progress. Within the global development of social
enterprises and accompanying hybrid business laws, Canada needs a
made-in-Canada approach.
CONCLUSION
The leaders of the B Corporation certification have made
considerable strides within the United States to collect like-minded
corporate leaders and bring them together to work towards improving the
world in which we live. For their efforts, they should be commended. In
only a short number of years, the B Corporation has managed to situate
itself squarely within the niche of business law as it relates to the CSR
movement. The B Corporation certification process carries with it many
virtues in helping to improve the American business landscape, and
hopefully it will have continued success.
B Lab’s lobbying effort to create benefit corporation laws across the
United States has been an interesting one, and rather remarkable given the
number of states that have willingly adopted these laws. As for B Lab’s
past lobbying efforts to implement the benefit corporation in Canada, this
Article has identified how some of B Lab’s efforts may be misplaced and
potentially detrimental to the legal development and progress in Canada,
and could as well for other countries if tried there. B Lab should be
cognizant of these risks as they champion American ideals of corporate
goodness within other legal systems. Having the support of a handful of
local advocates does not negate these risks, nor absolve B Lab from
ignorance over local and national laws, customs, and culture.
Some clarifications need to be made at this point. While this author
does not doubt the sincerity of the leaders of B Lab in improving the world,
their eagerness to market benefit corporation laws worldwide needs to be
tempered and carefully guarded against ethnocentrism. The goal is to
change the corporate landscape and support businesses that govern
themselves as they seek out ways to improve the world. B Lab has
acknowledged that Canada is an important “market” for them as there are
now more than 160 Certified B Corporations in Canada. B Lab has also
indicated that the obligation to consider stakeholder interests must be
100% affirmed under Canadian law before they will allow Canadian
companies to forego their article amendment process. When told of
Canada’s statutory requirement that directors exercise their fiduciary
duties in the “best interests of the corporation,” the oppression remedy and
other minority protections, the Supreme Court of Canada’s 2008 BCE
decision, etc., B Lab’s position did not change. It seems that the only way
B Lab can be satisfied is if Canadian statutes provide language that mirrors
the B Corporation’s. This is problematic.
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B Lab has also cited legal memoranda produced pro bono by
Canadian lawyers verifying the B Corporation amendments as a reason it
remains necessary. The nature of these memoranda are to respond to
questions posed by B Lab, which presumably asks whether there were any
inherent risks under Canadian law in requiring companies to adopt the
language B Lab has offered. The affirmation that there is little risk does
not in itself imply that the language is needed. Responding to a question
on legal risk is far different than addressing the policy need and
implications behind the implementation of particular laws.
While Canadian corporate laws are often quietly lumped together
with American legal scholarship under the assumption that the
fundamentals of Canadian governance mirror those in the United States,
that is simply not accurate. Certainly, Canadian laws do have features that
in many ways reflect and respond to those in the United States—but just
as there are cultural similarities between the two nations, there are also
stark differences.172 These differences need to be taken into account before
implementing American hybrid alternatives with features that are weaker
from a social governance standpoint than Canada’s existing laws.
There is one final point to consider regarding the future of the benefit
corporation, and B Lab’s ongoing pursuit of global influence and impact.
This Article began with the statement that business law does not exist in a
vacuum. On November 8, 2016, Canada and the rest of the world watched
as American voters elected Donald Trump as their next President of the
United States. As B Lab contemplates its next moves in the world, perhaps
the organization should concentrate on its own American constituents, and
prepare for the inevitable battles that are going to arise as their new
President takes office. As a great deal of the country’s reputational capital
around the world will likely be the squandered over the next few years,
this author hopes B Lab will be emboldened to take their lobbying clout
and focus on protecting the environment, the marginalized, the weak, and
those that become targets of hate under this new administration. To be
complicit now would ring hollow B Lab’s message to “use business as a
force for good” and “B the Change.”173 Now is the chance for B Lab to
take a more meaningful leadership role in good business in its own home
country. Canada will be watching.

172. See, e.g., Ronald B. Davis, Fox in S-OX North, A Question of Fit: The Adoption of United
States Market Solutions in Canada, 33 STETSON L. REV. 955, 981 (2004).
173. B CORPORATION, supra note 18.

